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ABSTRACT
While the COVID-19 pandemic continues to be as complex as ever, the collection and exchange
of data in the light of fighting coronavirus poses a major challenge for privacy systems around the
globe. The disease’s size and magnitude is not uncommon but it appears to be at the point of
hysteria surrounding it. Consequently, in a very short time, extreme measures for dealing with
the situation appear to have become the norm. Any such actions affect the privacy of individuals
in particular. For some cases, there is intensive monitoring of the whole population while the
medical data of those diagnosed with the virus is commonly circulated through institutions and
nations. This may well be in the interest of saving the world from a deadly disease, but is it really
appropriate and right? Although creative solutions have been implemented in many countries
to address the issue, proponents of privacy are concerned that technologies will eventually erode
privacy, while regulators and privacy supporters are worried about what kind of impact this could
bring. While that tension has always been present, privacy has been thrown into sharp relief by
the sheer urgency of containing an exponentially spreading virus. The essence of this dilemma
indicates that establishing the right equilibrium will be the best solution. The jurisprudence
concerning cases regarding the willingness of public officials to interfere with the constitutional
right to privacy in the interests of national security or public health has repeatedly proven that a
reasonable balance can be reached.
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1. Introduction
Today the coronavirus epidemic is overtaking areas of Asia, Europe and North America
in full intensity, with the USA reporting more coronavirus-related deaths than any other
country officially [1]. Everyday life has been impacted by the proliferation of virus, from
social networks [2–6] to e-governance [7, 8], from digital automation [9, 10] and cyber
security [11, 12] to cellular networks [13]. During the global coronavirus epidemic, many
high-tech approaches are placed in motion to help mankind combat the virus. The entire
world is coming to a standstill as policymakers are urging people to stay indoors, even
using coercion. It would not have been possible to separate ourselves from civilization if
people had no access to modern technology. Digital media services have provided content
for hundreds of millions of users, a vast amount of individuals have begun telecommuting
to schools and jobs, and the usage of safety devices has grown dramatically when millions
more patients are diagnosed with telehealth applications - the last thing politicians across
the globe expected was to see citizens with extremely infectious illness symptoms.
Nevertheless, the use of such technologies often poses several questions regarding pri-
vacy [14]. Israel also agreed to use the cellphone data gathered anonymously, typically
meant for counter-terrorism use. The information was used to identify people who crossed
paths with persons bearing COVID-19. A combination of geotracking and AI technology
has allowed the Israeli government to recognize individuals who should be quarantined
because of their potential coronavirus exposure. When the coronavirus pandemic spread
across the globe, countries leveraged massive monitoring networks to track the transmis-
sion of the virus and pressured policymakers around the world to consider the trade-offs
with millions of people in public health and safety. Government agencies in South Korea
are harnessing surveillance camera video, mobile location data, and credit card payment
records to help monitor recent coronavirus patient movements and create virus transmis-
sion chains. Iran launched an app promising to cure COVID-19. Today, much of what
it does is collect millions of people’s location info, effectively serving as a way for the
government to monitor its population in real time.
The U.S. aims to counter coronavirus through mobile location info. The White House
and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention are calling on Facebook, Google and
other tech giants to give them greater access to American smartphone location data to help
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them fight the spread of coronavirus, according to four people at the companies involved in
the discussions who are not authorized to speak publicly about it. Advocates for privacy
are concerned. Although, some sources emphasized that the effort would be anonymized
and the government would not have access to the locations of specific individuals. Federal
health authorities say they will use confidential, aggregated consumer data obtained by the
internet firms to monitor the distribution of the virus - a technique known as “syndromic
surveillance”, and avoid more outbreaks. They might still use the data to see if people
were using “social distancing.” In China, South Korea and Israel, similar and more extreme
monitoring techniques have also been used. The moves set off warning bells for privacy
activists who are fearful of what the government might do with consumer data. Facebook
also offers anonymized data to health experts and Charities in certain countries to help
deter epidemic efforts. Yet other reports cautioned that supplying government with greater
access to anonymized location data might now contribute to the downline degradation of
individual privacy, especially if the government begins asking for non-anonymized data.
The data-protection consequences of efforts to monitor coronavirus dissemination have
been increasingly evident in Asia. When this economic epidemic is fully under control, it
is possible that China will be commended for the scientific success with which it ultimately
succeeded in preventing an outbreak that could have infected billions. Yet it sure does come
at a expense. There are examples of “epidemic maps” displaying the exact position in real
time of reported and alleged cases so people can stop traveling to the same locations.
There’s also an app that lets people communicate with someone who acquired the virus
whether they’ve been on a train or plane. Such interventions are also successful, but they
involve the vast processing and distribution of accurate medical data. Similarly, creative
approaches to addressing the problem have been introduced in Korea and Singapore, and
ultimately, given the broad and apparent intrusions to privacy, they seem to have been
successful.
Nowhere in the world, the right to privacy is an absolute right. Laws on privacy and
data security can not and do not mess with a common-sense solution to saving lives. Of
this reason, all these systems allow the use and sharing of data for that purpose where
appropriate. Around the same time, it is not possible to ignore the criteria laid down in
the legislation-except in times of crisis. Disproportionate decisions and measures are often
the result of knee-jerk reactions, and everybody is at risk when that happens on a global
scale-no matter how often you wash your hands.
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Our Contributions: This paper presents the following contributions:
• Survey on privacy issues during pandemic. This paper provides the first comprehen-
sive survey on various privacy issues on various fronts that are taking place during
the pandemic. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive survey
that addresses privacy issues from all sectors from surveillance to medical data.
• Privacy principles recommendation. This paper presents various privacy princi-
ples recommendation for monitoring app and device designers that include privacy-
conscious mechanisms, aggregated anonymized data and volunteered data.
• Guideline for post-pandemic privacy restoration. Finally, this paper presents a com-
prehensive guideline to ensure post-pandemic privacy restoration that would be ben-
eficial for the public and private sectors alike.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the privacy issues. Section
III describes the recommended privacy principles. Section IV discusses the post-pandemic
privacy restoration. Finally, Section V concludes the paper with a highlight on the scope
of future work.
2.Privacy Issues
2.1. Aggressive Surveillance Measures
Deutsche Telekom, Europe’s biggest telco firm, announced that it is turning over 5 GB of
consumer data to the German Robert Koch Institute to counter coronavirus transmission,
COVID-19. The Institute would use the anonymized data to monitor the activities of
the general public to forecast how the virus spreads and to help address questions about
the social distance effectiveness. Similarly, Vodafone has published a five-point program
in which it promises that private consumer data will now be transferred to Lombardy,
Italy. And Austria’s largest telco, A1, has contributed the data as well. Critics point
out that other countries are already making more authoritarian use of mobile-phone data.
These data are used in China, Israel, and South Korea to monitor the connections of
contaminated locals and to ensure quarantine is enforced. Critics also question the legality
of the donation, and whether the data privacy of customers has been respected - and
whether the donation of data would be useful. Although GPS-related data, such as that
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obtained by Google, can be very reliable, cellular providers’ mobile phone tracking data
still use cell phone towers to locate the customers [15]. Its accuracy ranges from 25 to 100
metres, that might not be particularly helpful in big cities. While European officials assured
data-privacy advocates of not tracking individuals, consent and transparency issues were
not eased. Much information is associated with the mobility data, which could be worse
with the lack of transparency of the Telecom companies that have long been collecting and
selling geolocation data of their customers [16, 17]. In the US, the government is currently
engaged in talks with tech giants such as Google, Apple, and Facebook about how data
from their customers could be used to prevent COVID-19 from spreading.
A medical school in Hanover in Germany is collaborating with local mapping firm, Ubilabs,
to develop an app that will enable individualized monitoring of infections. A person who
has tested positive for COVID-19 voluntarily donates the GPS data [18] from their phone
with this app, named GeoHealth and expected to be available in a few weeks time. Many
users would be able to say whether they are at the same location, at the same time, as the
infected person. If the users get a “red signal,” they’re told to go and get checked, warning
them they were really close by. Recently, the government of the autonomous Spanish
territory of Catalonia has released its own, related app, named STOP COVID19 CAT.
Anonymous data can also be quickly re-identified, which, they claim, raises fear in cases
like this. This, and the absence of a system, has in the past been a significant obstacle to
the use of evidence in a humanitarian situation, as happened during Ebola. The Oxford
University academics and the health service’s digital innovation unit in UK also designed
a contact-tracing app (see Fig 1) that takes into account different age groups, household
structures and movement patterns in an effort to try to maximise the number of people
who could be allowed to freely move [19].
When South Korea is fighting a snowballing number of COVID-19 incidents, the govern-
ment is letting people know if they are in a patient’s area. But the volume of information
has led to some awkward moments and there is just as much fear of social stigma as of
illness. Such warnings arrive all day, all day, asking people where an infected person was.
People may also visit the Ministry of Health and Welfare website for information. When
online searching for the case number of a virus victim, the associated inquiries include
“contact information,” “name,” “photo,” “father” or even “adultery.” There are no names or
addresses given but certain people nevertheless tend to connect the dots and recognise indi-
viduals. And, even though patients aren’t specifically known, online they risk criticism or
mockery. Doctors warn that pursuing patients online may have very serious consequences.
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Figure 1. Oxford University contact-tracing app.
Malicious online remarks have long been a issue in South Korea, and have led to suicide in
some situations. Another known thing is elevated levels of anxiety due to online criticism
and endured sleep deprivation. Because the virus spreads quickly, the knowledge they need
to defend themselves and others will be made available to the public.
The good news is, however, that data security agencies from around the world are coming
in to provide their advice and feedback on data management practices and on fighting coro-
navirus. The contrasting perspective among the opinions of data protection agencies - who
may be categorized as punitive, impartial, or acceptable - indicates that the best response
would be to pursue a reasonable middle ground that does not neglect the enforcement of
basic standards of privacy. This is also in accordance with the announcement released on
March 16 by the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) stressing that data security
laws (such as GDPR) do not obstruct steps taken to counter the coronavirus pandemic.
Table 1 lists the guidelines on data management practices and on fighting coronavirus
issued by various countries and organizations.
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Country Data protection and Coronavirus (COVID-19) resources Country Data protection and Coronavirus (COVID-19) resources
Albania IDP Luxembourg National Commission for Data Protection
Guidelines on the protection of personal data in the context of the measures
taken against COVID-19 [EN]
Coronavirus (COVID-19): recommendations by the CNPD on the processing
of personal data in the context of a health crisis [EN] [FR]
Argentina Agencia de Acceso a la InformaciГүn PГәblica Mexico National Institute for Transparency, Access to Information and Personal
Data Protection (INAI)
Tratamiento de datos personales ante el Coronavirus [ES] Statement - Ante casos de COVID-19, INAI emite recomendaciones para
tratamiento de datos personales [ES]
Australia Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) Statement - Suspende INAI eventos pГәblicos, por recomendaciГүn de la
SSA para evitar contagio de COVID-19 [ES]
Coronavirus (COVID-19): Understanding your privacy obligations to your
staff - Agencies [EN]
Statement - AdoptarГғ INAI como medida de prevenciГүn el trabajo a dis-
tancia ante COVID-19 [ES]
Austria Austrian Data Protection Authority Transparency, Public Information Access and Personal Data Protection In-
stitute of Estado de MГқxico and Municipalities (Infoem)
Data Protection Authority Information on Coronavirus (COVID-19) [DE] Recomendaciones respecto a la garantГңa de los derechos de protecciГүn de
datos personales y acceso a la informaciГүn pГәblica, ante brote de COVID-
19 [ES]
Bulgaria Commission for Personal Data Protection Netherlands Data Protection Commission (Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens)
РӘРҸРЊРҰ РўСҠРўРҳРџРұРө Р»СҐР«СЂРҷРўР«РҳР»РҷРұРҳРёРҷСЉР„Рҷ
РёРҳСҐРәРҷ СҒСҐРҳСҚСЋ СҐРөРҹР»СҐР«СҒСЂСҐРөР„РҳР„РҷРҳСЂР«
Р„Рө COVID-19 [BG]
Statement - AP geeft organisaties meer tijd vanwege coronacrisis [NL]
Canada Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada FAQs on testing employees for Coronavirus (Corona op de werkvloer) [NL]
Announcement: Commissioner issues guidance on privacy and the COVID-
19 outbreak [EN]
FAQs on working from home (Veilig thuiswerken tijdens corona) [NL]
Guidance: Privacy and the COVID-19 outbreak [EN] New Zealand Office of the Privacy Commissioner
COVID-19 and privacy FAQs [EN]
Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Alberta PerГә Autoridad Nacional de ProtecciГүn de Datos Personales del PerГә
Privacy in a Pandemic [EN] Divulgar datos personales de pacientes con coronavirus puede ser multado
hasta con 215 mil soles [ES]
Czech Republic Office for Personal Data Protection Philippines National Privacy Commission
Ke zpracovГғnГң osobnГңch ГәdajЕѕ v rГғmci opatЕЄenГң proti
ЕғГңЕЄenГң koronaviru [CS]
Data protection in times of Emergency [EN]
EDPB Statement of the EDPB Chair on the processing of personal data in the
context of the COVID-19 outbreak [EN]
Protecting personal data in the time of COVID-19 [EN]
Finland Office of the Data Protection Ombudsman Poland Personal Data Protection Office of Poland
Data protection and limiting the spread of coronavirus [EN] Statement by the President of the Personal Data Protection Office on coro-
navirus [EN]
France Commission Nationale de lвҐЄInformatique et des LibertГқs San Marino AutoritГґ Garante per la protezione dei dati personali
Coronavirus (COVID-19) : les rappels de la CNIL sur la collecte de donnГқes
personnelles [FR]
Public announcement on COVID-19 emergency [EN] [IT]
Gibraltar Gibraltar Regulatory Authority Slovakia Office for Personal Data Protection of the Slovak Republic
Data protection and Coronavirus: What you need to know [EN] Statement of the EDPB Chair on the processing of personal data in the
context of the COVID-19 outbreak [SK]
Germany Office of the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of
Information
Coronavirus and processing of personal data [SK]
DSK provides information on data protection and Coronavirus [DE] Spain Catalan Data Protection Authority
German Data Protection Supervisory Authorities joint information paper on
data protection and the Coronavirus pandemic [DE]
Statement regarding the processing of personal data related to the measures
to deal with COVID-19 [CA][EN]
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania: Data Protection Commissioner (Landes-
beauftragte fГёr den Datenschutz Mecklenburg-Vorpommern)
Spanish Data Protection Agency (Agencia EspaГҫola de ProtecciГүn de
Datos)
Statement on Privacy and Coronavirus [DE] Report from the State Legal Service Department (the Spanish DPA) on
Processing Activities Relating to the Obligation for Controllers from Private
Companies and Public Administrations to Report on Workers Suffering from
COVID-19 [EN][ES]
Hong Kong Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data COVID-19 FAQs [ES]
The Use of Information on Social Media for Tracking Potential Carriers of
COVID-19 [EN]
Statement - La AEPD publica un informe sobre los tratamientos de datos
en relaciГүn con el COVID-19 [ES]
Masks and Police OfficersвҐЄ Car Registration Numbers [EN] Statement - Comunicado de la AEPD en relaciГүn con webs y apps que
ofrecen autoevaluaciones y consejos sobre el Coronavirus[ES]
Privacy Commissioner Responds to Privacy Issues Arising from Mandatory
Quarantine Measures and Provides Updates on Doxxing [EN]
Statement - CampaГҫas de phishing sobre el COVID-19 [ES]
Hungary Hungarian National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Informa-
tion
Switzerland Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner (FDPIC)
Information on processing data related to the Coronavirus epidemic [EN] Data protection legal framework for the containment of the coronavirus
[EN][DE][FR][IT]
Ireland Data Protection Commission United Kingdom Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO)
Data Protection and COVID-19 [EN] Data protection and coronavirus: statement for health and care practitioners
[EN]
Italy Data Protection Commission (Garante per la protezione dei dati personali) COVID-19: general data protection advice for data controllers [EN]
Coronavirus and data protection [IT] United Nations COVID-19: States should not abuse emergency measures to suppress human
rights - UN experts [EN]
Jersey Office of the Information Commissioner United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
Data Protection and Coronavirus [EN] FTC, FDA Send Warning Letters to Seven Companies about Unsupported
Claims that Products Can Treat or Prevent Coronavirus [EN]
Lithuania State Data Protection Inspectorate FERPA & Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
Personal Data Protection and Coronavirus COVID-19 [EN] [LT] Coronavirus Scams: What the FTC is Doing [EN]
Table 1. Country level data protection and management guidelines.
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2.2. Privacy of Medical Data
The coronavirus epidemic is forcing the US government to relax one of its few laws relating
to data protection. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act is one of
the protections against the misuse of patient records, but the Health and Human Services
Administration said it would waive fines for suspected HIPAA breaches which is very
common [20]. HIPAA prevents patients from sharing their personal records with health
care providers, thereby restricting the exploitation of the records. Such privacy provisions
restrict what types of technologies health care facilities can use, but this is evolving with
the coronavirus pandemic. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has
released a Notice to ensure that the organizations affected by HIPAA and their employees
are aware of this data rights provision that shall not be set aside in the case of an emergency.
Although HIPAA safeguards the protection of “protected health information” (PHI), this
is adjusted to ensure that reasonable uses and releases of the information can also be made
as required to handle a individual (the employee or dependent), to protect the general
welfare of the country, and to avoid a significant and immediate danger to a person or
the public’s health and safety. Via remote communication systems, protected health care
providers subject to the HIPAA Regulations may try to connect with patients and offer
telehealth services. Almost all video messaging provider complies with the HIPAA, as are
specialized systems such as Zoom for Healthcare and Skype for Business. However, with
the threat of COVID-19, the coronavirus-induced respiratory disease, to spread at a rapid
pace, and with governments advising people to remain home to control the epidemic, HHS
has agreed to open more popular video chatting apps for doctors to use. This includes
famous FaceTime, Facebook Messenger, Google Hangouts, and Skype apps. The Civil
Rights Office of the HHS said that with such non-compliant video messaging systems, it
would not place restrictions on health care providers.
Another concerning thing from the Bulletin notes that, in an outbreak of an infectious
illness such as COVID-19, HIPAA-covered workers will have the same right as HIPAA-
excluded workers to share workplace information with others if necessary to prevent or
minimize a significant and urgent risk to the health and safety of a worker or the public in
keeping with the applicable regulations. Therefore, employers may share information on the
location, general illness, or death of an employee or child to identify, locate, and warn family
members, guardians, and other individuals responsible for the care of that individual, if
necessary. HIPAA forbids, without their permission, the release of information about the
employee or dependent’s illness to the public. But the issue is that the media and the
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general public are not bound by HIPAA regulations and are also not subject to HIPAA
requirements because they provide details about a person who has contracted COVID-
19. PHI typically does not provide personally identified health documents kept by the
employer in employee reports necessary by the employer to meet its responsibilities under
the FMLA, ADA and related legislation, as well as files or records pertaining to other
work problems such as unemployment benefits and sick leave demands. So while there
may be other applicable state or federal privacy rules, HIPAA generally does not apply if
the information is not obtained from the health plan group. PHI may be needed by health
authorities and others responsible for ensuring public health and safety to allow them to
accomplish their mission of protecting the public from disease. The HIPAA privacy law also
includes provisions which will require employers to exchange information about workers or
dependents who have contracted COVID-19 with state and federal public health agencies,
such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and state and local health
departments.
2.3. Privacy of Student Data
FERPA is a Federal law which protects the privacy of records of student education. (20
U.S.C. Вљ 1232 g; 34 C.F.R. Section 99) All government agencies and organizations seek-
ing funds under any system operated by the Secretary of Education shall be subject to law.
Within FERPA, the word “educational agencies and institutions” typically encompasses in
the primary level school districts and high schools. In slowing the proliferation of COVID-
19 in U.S. populations, educational organizations and institutions such as school boards,
hospitals, colleges, and universities will play a major role. Educational organizations and
institutions may better protect their schools and neighborhoods by knowledge exchange
and collaboration with public health departments. The term “PII” refers to the name or
identification number of a student, as well as other information which can be used to dis-
tinguish or trace the identity of an individual, either directly or indirectly, through links
with other information. FERPA forbids government authorities (e.g., school districts) and
organizations ( e.g., schools) from releasing PII from the academic record of the children
without prior notification except where an exception to the general consent provision ap-
plies to FERPA. For example, under one such exemption, “health or safety emergency,”
educational agencies and universities may report PII from student education records to a
public health agency, without prior written permission in connection with an emergency, if
disclosure of the details by the public health authority is required to protect the health or
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safety of students or other individuals. FERPA requires school agencies and organizations
to reveal information from educational documents without permission until all PIIs have
been deleted, provided that the organization or institution has made a fair decision that
the student’s name is not publicly identifiable, whether by single or multiple releases, and
taking into account all fairly available information. Therefore, reporting that a student in
a certain class or grade level is missing would be troublesome because, for example, there
is a directory containing the names of every student in that class or grade. Many known
attacks have occurred and can de-anonymize individual data from the anonymized data
collection.
There is an exception to the general consent requirement of FERPA, “health or safety
emergency,” which is limited in time to the emergency period and generally does not allow
for a blanket release of PII from student education records. However, the concern is that
while educational agencies and institutions may frequently address threats to the health
or safety of students or other persons in a manner that does not identify a particular
student, FERPA allows educational agencies and institutions to disclose PII from student
education records to relevant parties in connection with an emergency without prior written
consent. Usually, law enforcement officers, public health authorities, qualified medical
professionals, and parents (including parents of an qualifying student) are the categories
of interested parties to which PII may be reported from school documents under this
FERPA exemption. The decision by an educational organization or entity that there
is a real emergency is not dependent on a vague or remote warning of a potential or
imminent disaster for which the possibility of occurrence is unclear, as should be discussed
in general emergency preparedness procedures, for the purposes of FERPA’s health or
safety emergency exemption.If local public health agencies decide that a public health
emergency, such as COVID-19, is a serious danger to the city’s children or other persons,
an educational organization or entity within the region may conclude that an emergency
also occurs. Under the FERPA health or safety emergency provision, it is the duty of an
educational organization or institution to make a case-by-case decision as to whether to
report PII from educational documents, and it must take into account the entirety of the
circumstances of the hazard. When the school organization or entity decides that there is an
articulate and important danger to the student’s or other individual’s health or safety, and
whether other parties require the PII from educational documents to protect the student’s
or other individual’s health or safety, it may reveal the information without permission
to those parties. It is a robust principle by which the Department does not substitute
its opinion with that of an educational agency or institution such that the educational
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agency or institution will have sufficient services to sustain the situation because, on the
basis of the knowledge available at the time of the assessment of the educational agency or
institution, there is a reasonable reason for such a decision. Therefore, there is a substantial
possibility that certain school organizations and institutions may report to the Department
of Public Health the names, addresses and telephone numbers of missing students without
permission, so that the Department of Health can contact their parents to determine the
illnesses of the children. There is also a possibility that a single pupil, teacher, or other
school official may be reported by the school as requiring COVID-19 for parents of other
students in the organization.
2.4. Teleconferencing Privacy (Zoombombing)
As a result of its coronavirus-fuelled market expansion, Teleconferencing firm Zoom is
attracting attention. Internet-rights activists claim they want Zoom, which was flooded
by demand after the ebola epidemic, to begin releasing a transparency report outlining
its data protection policies, and how it responds to governments trying to clamp down on
freedom of speech. The growing need for their services makes Zoom a priority for third
parties, ranging from law enforcement to sophisticated hackers targeting confidential data
and sensitive data. Meanwhile such gatherings will attract attention from regulators trying
to regulate the flow of information as people assemble online.
While the video conference software Zoom is gaining traction as a result of increased usage
of the coronavirus pandemic, federal authorities are now warning of a new possible risk
for privacy and security dubbed “Zoombombing.” The phrase applies to a type of cyber
abuse reported by some users of the app, who have claimed that some of their calls have
been intercepted by anonymous persons and trolls speculating hatefully. “Zoombombing”
has become so widespread that the FBI has released a news release reminding people of
the threat which includes profanity, pornography and swastika. These “Zoombombing”
incidents occur as Zoom faces criticism for its privacy rights, which customers, technology
experts and US regulators have flagged. In their efforts to mitigate these threats from
potential hackers or trolls, federal officials urged those using video teleconferencing apps
to exercise due diligence and caution. Malicious cyber actors are searching for ways to ma-
nipulate flaws in telework applications to obtain private information, eavesdrop on phone
calls or simulated meetings, or conduct other disruptive activities.
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2.5. Privacy of Sensitive Data
Coronavirus is a particularly infectious illness and will most likely entail the monitoring of
billions of individuals during 2020. Patients also exchange DNA-like evidence by handing
out a swab sample to hospitals. Although there’s no doubt that governments will do the
best for their people, it’s still important to remember that in the past, there have been
incidents of government records compromised. DOJ filed charges against Chinese hackers
for taping into Equifax just a few months earlier. Knowing that most Americans would
not be as pleased if important DNA data gathered through COVID-19 research ends up
in the hands of foreign states such as China and Iran, is necessary.
Clearview AI, a facial recognition company claiming to have scraped billions of viral images
off the internet and built tools capable of recognizing a face in seconds. It sells itself to
law enforcement within the U.S. but also to designated oppressive governments around the
world as part of a global growth program with histories of human rights violations. Palantir,
however, has comprehensive law enforcement contracts and offers little or no accountability
about its activities unless you are a client. The development of public-private partnerships
to exchange confidential data with organizations such as Clearview AI and Palantir in
times of disaster, such as a terrorist incident or pandemic, provides short-term gains but
has an disturbing effect on data protection even after the emergency passes. One major
concern is that after the crisis passes, new surveillance technologies deployed during the
coronavirus crises will become the’new normal’ and permanently embedded in daily life. It
will result in ongoing mass population monitoring without proper oversight, accountability
or justice. Of this, there is a history, albeit not long after. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 in
2001 led to the proliferation of surveillance cameras and networks across the U.S. and the
Patriot Act, a new statute that eliminated statutory guardrails for government oversight
and limited accountability, increasing the invasive and extensive surveillance powers of the
National Security Agency later exposed by whistleblower Edward Snowden. Despite the
public uproar against NSA activities, it is yet to be de-authorized by lawmakers.
There is no question about the presence of government departments to represent the people.
Nonetheless, people run institutions and often people make errors, errors that can reveal
sensitive information to hackers who do not have access to it. Governments will certainly
ensure that the tools they have built to combat extremism, such as the position monitoring
device used in Israel, remain in safe hands only. All people who want to secure their digital
life need to ensure that all connected devices are protected by reliable anti-virus software
as regards regular folks.
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2.6. Privacy of Tech Company Data
After the advent of the coronavirus pandemic, tech companies have provided their re-
sources, funds, and face mask stashes to help. Many organizations that work with the
data are now stepping up providing their tools for data collection to try and monitor or
avoid the virus spread. Unacast, a data company that collects and provides the retail,
real estate, marketing, and tourism industries with cellphone location data and analysis,
has recently revealed something called the Social Distancing Scoreboard [21]. The score-
board is an interactive map that gives letter ratings to each state and county in America
depending on how often Unacast’s examination of data conclude that its people conduct
social distancing. It’s the first offering from the company’s latest COVID-19 Location
Data Toolkit, and more location data will be introduced in the coming days and weeks to
demonstrate trends and patterns that the company hopes would.
Unacast isn’t the only tech firm that has used the technology for what it claims is a public
benefit these days. The “Data for Good” platform on Facebook uses de-identified statistical
data from its users to support its Disease Prevention Maps, which will offer information
about where people live and where they travel and can help health agencies monitor disease
transmission or anticipate when they will be heading next. Kinsa Health uses data from
its smart thermometers to attempt to identify extremely high rates of influenza with its
US Health Climate Monitor, which the organization claims has forecast the spread of
flu correctly in the past and may also map outbreaks of coronavirus. Unacast is a bit
different though. For the Facebook system and the Kinsa app, users will opt to monitor
their position and instead have a clear interaction with those businesses. In comparison,
Unacast receives app data from a number of third-party providers. Such outlets, according
to its privacy policy, include Unacast’s suppliers as well as the software development kit,
or SDK, which it puts in applications.
The stumbling point is that users give one of those applications permission to access
their location data without realizing that this location data will go to Unacast as well.
To the average consumer, there is no simple way to see what SDKs an app may use,
because the privacy rules of the app typically state the details goes to third parties without
disclosing who certain parties are. Unacast claims its SDK is its “preferred” data base on its
website, but when we asked for clarification the company wouldn’t specify the applications
or partners it deals with. An study by Apptopia, a smartphone app technology company,
finds Unacast’s SDK in all forms of iOS and Android phones, including smart TV remotes,
time trackers, sports, wireless wifi locators, weather forecasters and phase trackers. For
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these apps, users can always turn the location tracking off but some of them obviously
need the location services to be able to work at all.
While the chart itself can be a helpful device, it also makes such data collection activities
even more visible behind the scenes вҐҰ and how precise the data collected can become.
Unacast is hardly the only company doing this kind of data crunching. For example,
oneAudience, a marketing company, puts its SDK into apps to gather user information. The
firm also illegally collected social media data, as Facebook alleged in a recent complaint,
but the firm admitted this compilation was accidental, and that it changed its SDK to stop
it. The dilemma is there’s still no way for an ordinary customer swept up in the vortex
of tech companies to know exactly what’s going on with their position data, and which
companies have access to it and which firms secure it properly. Broadly speaking, there
are no federal regulations prohibiting the processing of such data and it is impossible for
users to take advantage of the privacy protections they have because most of them do not
even know that data collection services such as Unacast exist. Privacy activists have fears
that the extreme nature of the pandemic could also cause privacy rights to erode in this
region. The problem then is, in this case: Will the immediate gains of this data outweigh
the risks of long term privacy? One can guess the obvious answer would be a “No”.
3.Recommended Privacy Principles
One of the best tools at the hands of public health authorities during a epidemic crisis
is low-tech detective work. If a person is infected with a disease such as COVID-19, the
disease caused by the novel coronavirus, public health authorities figure out where they
have been lately and monitor all people they have been in touch with. The tension between
preserving the rights of people and obtaining knowledge that is important to the general
interest varies over the course of dissemination of a epidemic. Core specifics would need
to be sorted out by monitoring device designers: how to assess phone proximity and user
safety status, where the information is processed, who uses it, and in what format. Digital
contact tracing services are currently working in a variety of countries, but specifics are
sparse, and questions over privacy exist. In the following, we propose several recommended
privacy principles.
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3.1. Privacy-conscious mechanisms
Several new initiatives are aimed at developing cooperative, privacy-conscious mechanisms
for monitoring phones. A Massachusetts Institute of Technology team launched a prototype
of a Private Package app: Safe Paths. The app stores up to 28 days of GPS location
data provided by a user, logged every 5 minutes. If the individual performs successful
coronavirus tests, they can want to share their recent data with health authorities in order
to recognize and publicize the areas where others may have been at risk. A new version
of the app, which will be announced early, will equate recent movements of a user with an
infected person’s route and warn them to possible contact. Users wouldn’t know much more
about the infected person вҐҰ not their age, race, or geographical trajectory. The project,
which includes colleagues from Harvard University and the Mayo Clinic, is debating the
application’s ongoing pilot trials with a dozen cities and nations in every corner of the
country. Creating optional and anonymizing data contributions are healthy choices for
protecting human rights. Though it’s a safe way to do so lawfully, these devices can only
minimize disease risk if they’re used by enough people.
3.2. Aggregated anonymized data
For countries where data protection rules are stringent, one choice for data collection
is to allow telephone and other software providers to exchange confidential, aggregated
information that they have already gathered. The U.S. and European Union regulations are
very clear on how consumers of software and smartphones have to agree to the processing
of their data вҐҰ and how much information businesses have to provide on how such data
will be accessed, processed, and exchanged. Operating under those limits, mobile providers
in Germany and Italy have started to exchange cell phone tracking data in an aggregated,
anonymized format with health authorities. In Germany, which has some of the most
robust data privacy safeguards in Europe, the government may force a technology provider
to exchange location data on an person for national security purposes. While individual
users are not known, the data can show general patterns about where and when people
meet and prevent infection spreading. Google and Facebook are also debating the exchange
of anonymised location details with the U.S. government.
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3.3. Using volunteered data
Another choice is to use a coronavirus-specific app to start new, requiring users to willingly
share their location and health details. One emerging app in Germany depends in part on
location data already held by Google for its account holders. A person who is performing
favorably may use the GeoHealth app to donate the history of their place. The data
will then be anonymized and processed on a central server. A data analytics platform
developed by the Ubilabs tech firm will equate the history of users’ activity with that of
infected individuals, and the system will display color-coded warnings depending on how
recent they might have experienced the virus. As a mixture of GPS mapping, wireless
network data, and telephone communications using Bluetooth, the device will be able to
identify when a mobile comes within one meter from another.
4.Post-pandemic Privacy Restoration
Coordinated data-sharing has become an essential tool in the ongoing fight against coron-
avirus as scientists around the world work tirelessly to develop a viable vaccine. Mass data
collection methods are already being put to use in an effort to establish effective public
health strategies and protocols to curtail the spread of COVID-19. Naturally, no mat-
ter how well-intentioned, any form of sweeping government-sanctioned monitoring system
poses important questions: how are our confidential data used? Who does have access to
this? What is our data open to breaches and hacks? How will private corporations be using
it in the future? And, obviously, is there a way to minimize the possibility of violations
of privacy? There are critical issues that will most definitely resurface - even though we
are too stressed now to worry about them - once in the post-coronavirus period hysteria
ebbs and calm have been restored. Mobile location data provides advanced tracking capa-
bilities for governments to help implement quarantine enforcement. Digital thermometers
are being combined with face recognition technologies related to biometric repositories to
better identify the identification of individuals with a fever. Open access tools, such as
Nextstrain, use Gisaid, a forum for genomic data exchange, to help researchers identify
and analyze the virus.
In an unprecedented situation several policymakers are able to neglect the ramifications
of privacy in an attempt to save lives. The confidential data being gathered, though, is
not limited to policy and public health organisations. Throughout the United States, the
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government is partnering publicly with Verily, a sister corporation owned by Google, to
provide electronic verification services allowing users to have a Google account. Surveillance
security providers and smartphone device creators are now allowing access to confidential
data. For example, users of the Corona 100 m app will see the date a coronavirus patient
was infected, along with their race, ethnicity, age and where they went. Sensitive medical
records related to a patient will and should be kept confidential in ordinary circumstances.
Exposing them to private corporations is a matter of anxiety, particularly in the name of
public health, as such documents have considerable economic importance. For example,
they could provide valuable targeting data for health-care and pharmaceutical companies
to advertising agencies. They could also help inform health insurers making decisions
seeking to verify medical history when processing new policies and claims. Databases
containing identities linked to mobile location data do bear a price tag, especially for
consumer markets.
Data protection laws such as the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
and the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) would limit businesses attempting to
retain personal data of any kind, and even use it for potential commercial advantage. How-
ever, businesses must adopt the newest advances in privacy-enhancing technologies (PET)
to completely ensure regulatory enforcement and secure data-an enormously important
market commodity. As demonstrated by the World Economic Forum, this emerging type
of privacy technologies helps companies to exploit knowledge obtained from third-party
private data without disclosing sensitive information which can not and should not be ex-
changed. Luckily sophisticated cryptographic methods based on PET are now in use by
businesses. The global research community has rigorously sought and tested them, and
business members are deeply engaged in attempts to standardize PETs such as ZKProof
to promote wider acceptance. If correctly applied, PET will inspire companies, rather
than constrain them. It can help them to securely leverage third-party data and remain
competitive, without jeopardizing user privacy or business confidentiality.
5.Conclusion
Preserving privacy as we develop and implement these technical solutions will be criti-
cal. It is more than important ever to consider privacy principles as we collectively move
forward into this next phase of tracking, tracing and testing, and using similar technolo-
gies developed to address the pandemic. Meaningful consent must be obtained by being
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transparent about the reason for collecting data, what data is collected and how long it
is kept. Only when people make the decision to participate should data be collected with
consent and used in the manner explained. Clear and user-friendly communication aims to
encourage cooperative engagement and will ensure that anyone engaging with the system
makes informed decisions to engage in data collection. This should also ensure the user
is aware of the purpose of gathering the data, the essence of the data to be collected, the
length of data retention and the advantages of data collection.
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